Editorial comment
Guest Comment: Ian R. Coles (Senior Consultant) & Rachel Speight (Partner) – Mayer Brown International LLP
The mining industry has forever been subject to the consequences of international relations and politics – not to say the uncertainties caused by domestic policies in the era of resource nationalism. The recent decay of the post-war, rules-based order, together with the race for critical minerals, have taken that uncertainty to a different level.
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These challenges have been amplified by the trade wars sparked by tariffs introduced under the Trump administration. The effect of those tariffs on the movement of critical minerals around the planet has yet to be definitively determined, but the need to secure supply chains has never been greater. Probably the greatest shift has been the perceived need to reduce reliance on Chinese exports. This has become especially critical in the case of resource-constrained Europe, but the issue also resonates in the US which, by common consent, is many years behind China in both sourcing mineral supplies and facilitating processing.
Just a few examples illustrate the problem – China controls more than 90% of global supply of processed graphite, manganese, and rare earths, and more than 70% of cobalt and lithium. In a level playing field within a free trade environment, this would not necessarily be an issue. However, China (and other countries) have not been afraid to use mineral dominance to reinforce political and economic imperatives. Most recently, China used its dominance in lithium mining and processing to trigger fluctuations in price. Its dominance in the supply of processed energy transition metals has the potential to cause chaos in supply chains – neither the US nor anywhere else will come close to challenging China’s dominance for many years to come.
Several Gulf nations, now with significant financial firepower and a desire to play a bigger role on the international stage, are having an impact across the industry. In the case of Saudi Arabia this has been in an attempt to boost investment in its domestic mining potential (mining is the third pillar of Saudi’s Vision 2030). In Saudi and other Gulf states, taking advantage of cheap local energy to develop metal processing infrastructure has seen significant investment. For many Gulf nations with sovereign wealth funds – in particular Saudi, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar – capital has been deployed to invest in the mining industry globally, particularly in Africa but also in South America (for example Manara’s investment in Vale’s base metal subsidiary).
A further example of geopolitical influence on the mining sector can be seen in the Sahel region of Africa, where terrorist activities have posed challenges for mining projects – particularly gold – in Burkina Faso, Mali, and elsewhere. Their emergence has no doubt been assisted by the breakdown in stable government and, in the case of Francophone countries, a fracturing of the relationship with France (since 2020 there have been six successful coups across the region). The Global Terrorism Index reported that in 2024 Burkina Faso was the country most affected by terrorism globally, repeating its position in 2023. Mining provides a lucrative source of revenue for these groups so, without effective military intervention, this is a problem which is not going to go away. Suggestions that Russia – including the Wagner group – might enable some stability appear to be wide of the mark.
These are just three examples of how geopolitics is impacting the mining industry. There are many more – and the current global political climate suggests those impacts are unlikely to fade.
